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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of credit rating changes on managers’ capital structure 
decisions in Greek listed firms. It is an attempt to combine traditional capital structure 
theories with the modern credit rating-capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS). Many of 
the theoretically proposed determinants of leverage appear insignificant in this study. 
Leverage ratios present on average ambiguous variations around the year of credit rating 
change. Firms close to a credit rating change appear to issue more debt relative to equity 
no matter the direction of the change. On the contrary, these results are persistent with 
companies that expect to be downgraded from investment to speculation grade. The 
overall results are partly consistent with the CR-CS theory.  
Keywords: Credit ratings, agency costs, capital structure, leverage 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Introduction 
Corporate credit ratings are assessments of the ability and willingness of 
companies to meet their financial commitments. They are of paramount importance for 
companies, since they provide potential investors with independent (and up to a point 
‘personal’) information about each company’s credit quality that is not publicly 
available, hence affecting the level of investments these companies can attract. 
Investments are the heart and lungs of all listed companies; they are vital for their 
durability and one of the main capital sources. Since credit ratings signal a company’s 
quality to potential financiers, it is at least rational to believe that credit ratings affect 
capital structure. 
Managers themselves admit to take credit ratings into serious consideration 
when making capital structure decisions. In 1999 Graham and Harvey surveyed 392 
CFOs in the US and Canada about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital 
structure. The results were published in 2001 and, among others, showed that credit 
ratings, following financial flexibility, are with 57.1% the second most important factor 
that affects managers’ decision on the appropriate amount of debt for their firms. Bancel 
and Mittoo (2002) tried to replicate the previous research employing European data and 
focusing primarily on capital structure. They surveyed a total of 710 firms from 17 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden and the UK) and found that credit ratings play significant role to managers’ 
decision by getting a 72.22%1. 
Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman (2009) take a step further proving that 
companies not only target their ratings, but when observed ratings deviate from their 
targets, companies make subsequent corporate finance choices in order to rebalance 
their leverage.  
                                                             
1 More specifically, both survey questionnaires contained the question “What factors affect how you 
choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?” where credit ratings were identified as ‘important’ 
or ‘very important’ by 57.1% of the American and 72.22% of the European managers. 
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The main objective of our study is to examine whether changes in corporate 
credit ratings affect the capital structure decisions of Greek managers. More 
specifically, we assess whether Greek companies take into account expected rating 
changes when determining the optimal level of leverage. Therefore, we expect to find a 
significant relationship between credit rating changes and capital structure, since Greek 
managers claimed to place great importance to credit ratings according to the survey of 
Bancel and Mittoo (2002). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that employs data from the 
Greek capital market in order to draw conclusions related to the importance of credit 
ratings in the capital structuring process. Genimakis (2008), using data from Greek 
listed firms, examined the impact of several theoretically accepted factors on leverage 
(e.g. profitability, tangibility, firm size etc) including among these factors the credit 
ratings provided by ICAP S.A., a local company specialized in assessing and managing 
corporate credit risk. His findings demonstrated a statistically significant relationship 
between ratings and the level of leverage, however, his study does not provide any  
interpretation for the ratings used. Finally, we cast doubt for the reliability of ratings 
offered by ICAP since it is a small local firm without international credentials. For the 
above reasons, our study attempts to fill this gap by using reliable credit ratings data and 
test whether the latter affect corporate capital structure. 
Our study is motivated by the study of Kisgen (2006) who put forward the 
“credit rating- capital structure hypothesis” (CR-CS). In specific, he empirically showed 
that credit ratings directly affect firm’s capital structure decisions of managers in the 
US. Kisgen argues that there are discrete costs and benefits associated with different 
credit rating levels, even that managers’ concern about credit ratings is due to these 
costs. He finds that firms near a rating change issue annually less net debt relative to net 
equity as a percentage of total assets than firms not near a rating change. However, his 
methodology is rather detailed and complex and beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In this study we assess the relationship between credit ratings and capital 
structure in a much simpler way. First, we will try to assess the general reaction of  
Greek listed firms to credit rating changes with regard to leverage. We do this by 
employing data only from companies that experience a credit rating change. Then we 
split the full sample into two sub-samples: one sample including those firms 
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experiencing an upgrade and one sample with those firms that undergo credit 
downgrade. Using tests for equality, we find that Greek listed companies, on average, 
change their leverage levels in response to credit rating changes. In specific, we 
document that “downgraded” firms increase their total debt as scaled by total assets in 
the year following the credit rating change. This reaction can be attributed to rising 
long-term debt, as shown by the ratios of long-term debt/total assets. On the other hand, 
debt/equity ratios remain, on average, virtually constant, indicating that rating changes 
trigger increases not only in the amount of debt, but also in the amount of equity used. 
Our second objective is to test the robustness of our initial results by running 
regression analysis. In particular, we test the relationship between credit rating changes 
and different expressions of leverage. We find that, under certain conditions, credit 
rating changes play significant role in determining capital structure. Finally, we attempt 
to interpret the (in)significance of other factors that are theoretically assumed to affect 
capital structure. 
We believe that our study contributes to the scarce literature by providing data 
from a capital market that is characterized by limited access to finance sources and 
strong managerial entrenchment since major shareholders usually run their business. For 
that reason, we believe that the Greek capital market is a good laboratory to re-assess 
the so-called CR-CS hypothesis. 
 The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the importance 
of credit ratings for market participants and briefly refers to existing capital structure 
theories. Chapter 3 reports the main ideas developed in the literature concerning capital 
structure. Chapter 4 describes the data and methodologies we used. In Chapter 5 we 
present and analyse our empirical results and finally, in Chapter 6 we draw our overall 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. Credit ratings and capital structure theories 
2.1. The importance of credit ratings 
 According to the definition given by Standard & Poor’s, a credit rating is an 
opinion of the general creditworthiness of an obligor (issuer rating), or the 
creditworthiness of an obligor in respect of a specific debt security, or other financial 
obligation (issue rating), based on relevant risk factors. Corporations place a great deal 
of importance to their credit ratings as they largely determine their access to external 
financing and the cost of acquiring it. It is of paramount importance for companies to 
maintain proper credit ratings as they affect the investors’ investment decisions. It is 
only after scrutinizing a company’s profile that investors take the step of investing. 
Credit ratings act as a signal of a company’s credit quality during such scrutiny. 
 The most important impact of credit ratings’ signaling function is the fact that 
rating changes are often accompanied by variations in stock prices. Goh and Ederington 
(1993) argue that, conditional upon the type of the downgrade, there is, in general, a 
significant negative stock response to downgrades. To the extent such ‘responses’ 
(negative or positive) affect the firm’s cost of capital, companies have serious incentives 
to preserve a higher rating. 
 Kisgen (2007) suggests that credit ratings are important for several other reasons 
too. There are certain regulations on bond investment directly tied to credit ratings. For 
instance, low credit rating levels prevent particular investor groups such as banks or 
pension funds from investing in a firm’s bonds and pose stricter capital requirements to 
investor groups such as insurance companies or brokers–dealers for investing in a firm’s 
bonds.  
 In the same paper he argues that credit ratings also affect a company’s material 
relationship with third parties like other companies and their shareholders, and 
suppliers. Other companies may choose not to engage in any kind of long-term contract 
with a speculative-grade company. Suppliers may require specific credit ratings before 
entering into long-term supply contracts with their counterparties. Even employees may 
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feel unsecure working for a low rating company thus demanding higher compensation 
for the risk they undertake. 
 Above all, credit ratings provide investors with more ‘inside’ information about 
each company that is not directly available in the markets. Rating agencies enjoy access 
to company information, which firms, fearing that they will jeopardize their strategic 
position against competitors, may be uneager to disclose. This information is valuable 
to investors for one more reason; rating agencies or other companies providing 
corporate ratings like Morningstar or Amadeus specialize in gathering, elaborating and 
evaluating company information thereby producing reliable measures of firms’ credit 
quality. Investors alone would most probably be incapable of successfully processing all 
this information before taking investment decisions. 
 Flannery (1986), on the other hand, argues that, in the presence of this 
information asymmetry, rational investors will try to infer firm’s quality from its 
financial structure and evaluates the extent to which insiders’ information is reflected 
upon the debt choices of companies. Nevertheless, we cannot safely accept neither that 
investors are rational nor that they can correctly interpret the information ‘written on’ 
the capital structure of firms; and this is the reason why they depend on credit ratings’ 
signals. 
 As long as credit ratings affect the level of investments a company can attract 
and its cost of capital, they must play a crucial role in the capital structuring process. 
 
2.2. Traditional capital structure theories 
Capital structure refers to the mixture of debt and equity capital that a firm uses 
to finance its overall operations and growth. From the classical Modigliani–Miller 
theorem2  to the most recent approach of market timing (firms tend to issue equity 
following a stock price run-up), countless studies tried to answer Myers’ (1984) simple 
but comprehensive question "How do firms choose their capital structures?". 
                                                             
2 Modigliani & Miller (1958) demonstrated that under a perfect market and in the absence of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information, the value of a firm is irrelevant to the level of debt 
included in the capital mix. 
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Many theories of capital structure have been proposed. The most popular among 
them seems to be the “trade-off theory” in which managers have to evaluate the trade-
off between the tax-deductibility of debt and the bankruptcy costs related to it. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) proposed the “pecking order theory” which states that firms prefer to 
issue debt rather than equity if internal finance is insufficient – equity is used only as a 
last resort. Another idea that has been gaining ground lately is the theory of “market 
timing” according to which, firms prefer equity when the relative cost of equity is low, 
and prefer debt otherwise. Finally, agency theory, introduced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), illustrates that a firm’s capital structure is determined by agency costs, which 
include the costs for both debt and equity issue. These agency costs arise due to the 
conflicts of interest between firms’ shareholders and managers. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the available studies “generally agree that 
leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and 
firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and 
development expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of the 
product.” Frank and Goyal (2009) examine the relative importance of several factors in 
the capital structure decisions of listed American firms from 1950 to 2003 and find that 
the most reliable among them for explaining market leverage are: industry median 
leverage, tangibility, profits, firm size, market-to-book assets ratio and expected 
inflation.  On the other hand however, Titman and Wessels (1988) find that their 
“results do not provide support for an effect on debt ratios arising from non-debt tax 
shields, volatility, collateral value, or future growth.” Taking these opposing arguments 
into consideration we infer that the relationship between capital structure and its 
determinants is not consistent. The empirical results vary, and in some times contradict.  
In this study we assess the determinants of capital structure that we consider 
most important such as profitability, liquidity, tangibility, firm size, effective tax rate 
and growth opportunities and how these are affected by credit rating changes. One of 
the limitations of our study is the exclusion of other variables that affect capital 
structure such as market conditions, macroeconomic factors etc. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Literature Review 
 Graham and Harvey (2001) shed light for a deeper investigation of corporate 
finance theories. In order to analyze the current practice of corporate finance they 
examined among others the entrepreneurs’ response regarding firm size, P/E ratio, 
leverage, credit rating, dividend policy, industry, management ownership etc. They 
supported that executives care about financial flexibility and a good credit rating when 
they form their debt policy. In addition, when they issue equity, respondents are 
concerned about earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation. Very 
little evidence is given to asset substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, 
free cash flows, or personal taxes. In their analysis of capital structure, the authors 
pointed out two fundamental debt policy factors which are financial flexibility and 
credit ratings. Empirically, numerous tests have been conducted to show that small 
companies have lower credit ratings, a lower incidence of paying dividends, a higher 
chance of being privately owned and a lower proportion of foreign revenue. Conversely, 
small companies are linked to lower credit ratings and higher degree of management 
ownership. Lastly, firms that do not pay dividends have low credit ratings. 
 Another strand of the literature surveys the capital structure and its determinants. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2002) provide data based on European firms. Carrying out a survey 
the authors observed that the most important factors in order to choose a debt policy are 
financial flexibility, credit rating and tax advantage of debt. 
 When reviewing the literature concerning the impact of credit ratings on capital 
structure, one must pay attention to the seminar study of Kisgen (2006). He was the first 
to show that credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions of a firm. He 
primarily examined the discrete costs and benefits of different credit rating levels in 
order to detect their influence on capital structure. According to Kisgen (2006), 
managers take into consideration corporate credit ratings. Regulations regarding 
investments are related to credit ratings. Whether a bank or an investor group can invest 
in a firm’s bonds depends on credit rating levels. Credit ratings signal the firm’s quality 
thereby drawing investors’ attention before acting. A credit rating change has also the 
property of changing the firm’s cost of capital but this can happen only if the market 
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takes ratings into serious consideration and pools them together. Kisgen (2006) asserted 
that credit rating changes could become influential for a firm in several ways, for 
example, they may cause a change in bond coupon rate, a loss of a contract, or a loss of 
access to the commercial paper market.  Moreover, managers are also interested in these 
different rating levels whereas investors use ratings data to evaluate a firm’s quality and 
thus a firm’s cost of capital. Kisgen (2006) also tried to combine the credit ratings-
capital structure theory with traditional capital structure theories. For example, he found 
that in the tradeoff and pecking order theories credit rating dummy variables are 
statistically significant. 
  He then conducted tests to see if the percentage of net debt relative to net equity 
is lower for firms near a change in rating for a specific period. He found that firms 
which incur a credit rating upgrade or downgrade will issue less net debt relative to net 
equity to either avoid a downgrade or to increase the chances of an upgrade. His 
methodology includes a regression of net debt to net equity using dummy variables that 
separate the firms which undergo a credit rating change and those which do not. In 
specific, he found that the net debt to net equity decreases 1% as a percentage of total 
assets annually between firms with a rating change than those not having a change.  
 Through various econometric approaches he demonstrated that either upgrade or 
downgrade credit ratings have a strong impact on capital structure decisions. He lastly 
asserted through surveys that credit ratings affect managers and that in the future credit 
ratings could be an integral part of capital structure in case that someone wants to 
acquire an absolute knowledge of capital structure behaviour. 
In a later study, Kisgen (2007) pointed out that a specific credit rating proves to 
be beneficial for shareholder’s value and presents the advantages for a company. For 
example, the access to commercial paper, the regulations tied to ratings, ratings triggers 
and ‘signaling’ meaning that credit ratings provide information for companies not being 
in public domain. Referring to ratings triggers he cited as an example the case of Enron 
(an electricity and natural gas company) which faced high debt payments due to a credit 
rating downgrade. 
Kisgen (2007) believes that credit ratings can also influence third parties, 
including firms’ managers and employees, suppliers and financial counterparties. Based 
on the case of EDS (Electronic Data Systems) he argued that employees are less willing 
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to work at a firm that has a lower rating and demand higher compensation for taking the 
risk. There also exist companies that may require specific credit ratings before entering 
into long-term supply contracts, or that may insist on certain rating for taking part in a 
swap arrangement.  
Trying to describe the benefits of credit ratings in determining the firm’s optimal 
level of leverage he drew a graph of a firm’s value as a function of leverage for a 
hypothetical company based on the trade-off theory and a second graph depicting the 
firm value with credit rating and trade-off effects. The first one depicted a continuous 
line as implied by the trade-off theory, whereas the second line presented “jumps” at 
certain levels of leverage, caused by the benefits added at discrete levels of rating. The 
two graphs clearly indicated that the liquidity and lower cost of debt attributed to higher 
credit ratings (investment grade) could outweigh the tax and incentive benefits of more 
debt, thereby reducing the optimal level of leverage. 
Empirical evidence enhances Kisgen’s view that companies close to either a 
downgrade or an upgrade in credit rating are more vulnerable to the reduction of 
leverage than companies which are far from a rating change. He also supported in his 
analysis that companies prefer upgrade ratings to downgrade ones. His study concluded 
that the higher the credit ratings the better for the shareholders. However, the argument 
here is that each capital structure policy represents a specific firm. He also cited an 
example concerning companies with a perspective to access public debt markets, which 
may not give so much attention to an increase in their credit ratings or may even not 
want to have a credit rating at all. On the other hand, companies that pay attention to 
credit ratings and rely on commercial paper market will certainly work hard to preserve 
high credit ratings. His findings lastly demonstrated that in case of a credit rating 
change managers try to reduce debt rather than equity and that is justified from the fact 
that they prefer upgrades than downgrades. Especially firms presenting downgrades are 
more careful and try to improve their rating from fear of falling below investment grade. 
Chen and Shyu (2008) investigated how credit rating management behaviour 
impacts optimal capital structure decisions. Their findings were based on models which 
are found to outline different behaviours regarding credit rating management. These are 
the behaviour as targeting initial rating, the behaviour as linking firm’s credit to debt’s 
coupons and the behaviour as targeting minimum rating.  
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The first issue explains the reason why firms fairly abandon additional tax 
benefits to have low leverage ratios. Due to the fact that managers prefer “a-better-
rating” benefits to traditional tax benefits they use debt conservatively and make under-
levered choices without trying to maximize traditional tradeoff benefits. The other 
behaviour comes to the conclusion that since firms’ rating at the time of debt issuance is 
not too low, it may offer some advantages. For example, they allow for debtholders to 
earn more coupons or benefit shareholders by additional tax shields. Lastly, the third 
choice of behaviour is known to provoke mean reversion in leverage dynamics. When a 
firm wants to acquire the initial target rating, by repurchasing debt it can obtain a 
different leverage ratio very close to the initial optimal level. It is noticeable that 
sometimes managers, in their attempt to reach the initial target rating, ignore the 
fractional loss in tradeoff benefits and make over-repurchase choices. The degree of 
moving leverage ratio towards the initial target and the improvements in firm’s credit 
rating policy are the two elements of the repurchase. 
Niu (2008) begins with the consensus that the components of capital structure 
are the debt and equity financing. His analysis includes traditional theories concerning 
capital structure such as Modigliani and Miller Theory, Static Trade-off Theory and 
Agency Costs based theory. At the end the author emphasizes the seven determinants of 
the capital structure which are tangibility, effective tax rate, size, profitability (ROA), 
growth opportunities, volatility of earnings and liquidity. 
Through questionnaires Genimakis (2008) collected data for 259 Greek 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, excluding banks, financial services and 
insurance companies. He found that the majority of managers choose the theory of 
ranking and agree that there is information asymmetry to the market. Thus a public 
subscribe is linked with shareholder’s value depreciation. Using different expressions of 
leverage, he found significant relations among leverage and ratings, level of 
development, depreciation, volatility of profits and the degree of consolidation. 
Moreover, profits are negatively affected by the age of business, whereas the number of 
employees is not statistically significant. Also, big companies with high fixed assets 
present high debt so they face low credit risk and high leverage. He then repeated his 
tests after separating the companies according to their industry sector and activity. 
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The third and most recent study of Kisgen (2009) is an answer to the question 
whether firms target credit ratings or leverage levels. The study is actually an extension 
of his first research conducted in 2006. He asserted that firm’s progress is related to 
higher credit ratings and he continued that firms with an upper or lower rating decrease 
leverage compared to firms in the middle of rating categories. 
Managers, in their attempt to keep good ratings, have to avoid downgrades and 
gain upgrades while simultaneously reducing leverage after downgrades to regain their 
target rating. That doesn’t mean automatically that they should increase their leverage 
after upgrades. Kisgen (2009) tested whether leverage behaviour follows rating changes 
and specifically found that firms react asymmetrically to lowering leverage after 
downgrades while responding less to upgrades. Thus, managers desire specific 
minimum credit rating levels in the presence of credit ratings along with standard tax, 
information, agency, and financial distress factors that can shape a complete model of 
capital structure.   
He continued by investigating the capital structure reaction before credit rating 
changes as well as on or after rating changes.  His analysis was based on comparisons 
regarding managers’ behaviour before and after the credit rating change. The main 
finding of this study that managers attempt to regain a target rating after a downgrade, is 
consistent with the notion presented in his previous studies that managers try to avoid 
downgrading. Moreover, he conducted tests to see how credit ratings form capital 
structure decisions and whether credit ratings affect certain channels of funding more 
directly. Another difference from the research in 2006 is that although his identification 
strategy was to omit large offerings, he now takes them into account. Therefore, we can 
assert that the implications of this paper cover a broader set of capital market behavior. 
Next, Kisgen (2009) examined downgrade effects and how certain financial 
decision mechanisms influence them. The results indicated that managers consider 
capital structure behaviour to target minimum credit rating levels over time. In addition, 
firms are more likely to reduce debt and less likely to issue debt following a downgrade, 
and they are also less likely to reduce equity after a downgrade. He also claimed that 
capital structure decisions are more affected by firms’ credit rating downgrades that 
occurred in the previous year than by changes in leverage or profitability. He also noted 
that firms aim at a specific credit rating and that there are rules which affect investments 
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in a firm’s bonds and commercial paper access. Rules that determine whether banks and 
pension funds can invest in the bonds, the capital charges that investors like insurance 
companies acquire from holding the bonds and the listing and disclosure requirements 
for the bonds are composed according to ratings. 
 Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman (2009) also analyzed credit rating targets. 
They believe that credit ratings are an integral part of a firm’s capital structure. The 
authors conducted tests on the hypothesis that firms have target credit ratings that reflect 
the costs and benefits associated with higher bankruptcy risk. Running several 
regressions they pointed out that firms with higher credit ratings are more careful with 
their debt choices with the view to gain higher ratings. They observed that companies 
gain higher ratings when they experience both high market to book ratios and selling 
expenses. Influenced by higher ratings, customers and other stakeholders become 
interested in these companies’ long term obligations and take a short position in the 
capital market. They also pointed out that firms with the lowest bankruptcy costs are not 
necessarily those with the lowest ratings, as the trade-off theory would imply. More 
tangible assets for firms, than their industry peers, mean higher ratings. Another finding 
from the regression analysis is that the firm presenting unexpected ratings and leverage 
ratios towards its targets can influence debt versus equity issuance and repurchase 
choices. It is strongly believed that firms make corporate finance choices to offset 
shocks that move them away from their target capital structures. 
In addition, Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman (2009) found that the effect of the 
deviation from the targets tends to be rather asymmetric, meaning that the extent to 
which firms are under-rated seems to have an influence on these corporate finance 
choices, but this is not observed with over-rated firms. Lastly, they concluded that 
managers are keen on higher ratings whereas they play a more important role in 
companies’ choices when they are in boom. 
  Kronwald (2009) also examined the credit rating - capital structure relation. 
Based on Kisgen’s approach, he found some evidence about the factors affecting capital 
structure decisions. Looking at Modigliani and Miller’s theorem (1958) he claimed that 
the main drawback of this theorem is the exclusion from the analysis of some factors in 
the capital structure decision such as bankruptcy costs, taxes, agency costs and 
information asymmetry. Efforts of following theories like the tradeoff- and pecking-
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order-theory to capture these factors were also inadequate. The first one introduced only 
bankruptcy costs and taxes whereas the other introduces only information asymmetry 
into the capital structure discussion.  
Kronwald (2009) asserted that the most important feature of capital structure 
was credit ratings and analysed Kisgen’s thought. His view was also based on the 
assumption that credit ratings have an impact on capital structure decisions due to 
discrete costs (benefits) associated with a rating change. He documented the utility of 
credit ratings to capital structure decisions and the situations in which they are vital. 
This can be explained if we measure the credit rating change of firms. He also 
implemented empirical tests concerning the credit rating-capital structure relation and 
connected them with the tradeoff- and pecking-order-theories. His results were 
consistent with the CR-CS theory which states that for firms near an upgrade, it is better 
in some situations to issue equity instead of debt to reach a higher rating level. 
Gubin (2009) demonstrated that the market leverage provides more accurate 
predictions of ratings than book leverage. He found out that even similar models 
replacing book leverage with market leverage are both more accurate and precise in 
predicting credit ratings. He also specified that only corporate managers and academics 
can use market leverage as an approximation for the analysis conducted by rating 
agencies. He then measured if firms with growth options enjoy different treatment by 
rating agencies. He combined growth options with market valuations to see how they 
influence ratings. The results showed that in the case of growth options that present 
long-term value for a firm, the default probability for the firm should decrease and this 
happens when firms issue new equity on the option’s value. In addition, rating agencies 
consider growth options relative to the size of assets-in-place in assessing default risk.  
Gubin (2009) also stated that credit ratings are mostly influenced by decreasing 
leverage, and therefore managers should take it into consideration. Moreover, he 
separated low-growth firms from those of high growth and found that the market 
leverage is more significant to the first of the two groups. As a result, assets serving as 
guarantee for growth options can lead to ratings positively affected by the presence of 
additional growth options. 
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Frank and Goyal (2009) carried out a detailed analysis of the capital structure 
decisions. They noted that capital structure is closely related to leverage so they made a 
reference to past capital structure theories and identified which factors are reliably 
important for determining leverage. They outlined that these are the profitability, size, 
growth, industry, nature of assets, taxation, risk, supply-side constraints, stock market 
conditions, debt market conditions and macroeconomic conditions. They also referred 
to some factors which have an effect on market-based leverage, for example, firms that 
have more tangible assets tend to have more leverage or firms that have more profits 
tend to have less leverage. Their analysis led them to a set of six core factors (industry 
median leverage, tangibility, profits, firm size, market-to-book assets ratio) which 
accounted for more than 27% of the variation in leverage, while all other factors they 
examined (nature of assets, macroeconomic conditions etc) added only a further 2%. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.  Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data Description 
 The sample consists of all publicly-traded Greek firms that have credit ratings 
available in the Amadeus database for the period from 2001 to 2008. Amadeus is a 
comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information on over 11 
million public and private companies in 41 European countries. It combines data from 
over 35 sources with software for searching and analysis. It is provided by Bureau van 
Dijk, a supplier of corporate, financial, marketing and economic databases and 
manipulation software, directories, technical, legal and bibliographic data, today owned 
by a leading private equity firm named BC Partners.  
The sample under question consists of 254 companies listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange, excluding banks, insurances and investment companies due to data 
unavailability. We extract data for corporate credit ratings and capital structure from 
Amadeus. However, market-to-book ratios were derived from Thomson because 
Amadeus provided data only since 2006. As a result, we were forced to completely omit 
from the regression analysis, those companies which, although available in Amadeus, 
did not appear in the Thomson market-to-book ratio list at all. In case of missing data 
(e.g. Aegean Airlines 2008 Total Assets) we searched companies’ websites and filled in 
whenever this was possible. Due to missing data, the equality tests do not possess the 
same number of observations for all examined variables. Both regression analysis and 
equality tests were carried out by the Eviews 7 software package.  
 
4.1.1. Leverage 
a. Definition of leverage 
 Looking at the leverage is probably the most complicated task in our analysis. 
Leverage appears in several different forms in the literature. The most frequently 
encountered definition is that the leverage ratio is any ratio used to calculate the 
financing methods of a company and its ability to meet its obligations, so long as it 
includes four main factors: debt, equity, assets and interest expenses. An official 
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definition is given by D’Hustler (2009), senior financial sector specialist in the 
Financial Systems Department of the World Bank, according to whom “the leverage 
ratio is generally expressed as Tier 1 capital as a proportion of total adjusted assets. 
Tier 1 capital is broadly defined as the sum of capital and reserves minus some 
intangible assets such as goodwill, software expenses, and deferred tax assets.” Harris 
and Raviv (1991) used a debt ratio of book value of long-term funded debt divided by 
total funded capital, while Rajan and Zingales (1995) proposed several measures like 
debt to total or net assets and debt to capital. 
 Another issue that arises is whether one should use book or market values when 
considering leverage. Myers (1977) claimed that book values are more accurate because 
they refer to assets in place i.e. property that the company already owns, while 
significant part of market values account for the present value of future growth 
opportunities i.e. assets that are not yet in place. Book values are also favored by a large 
number of managers who claim not to readjust their capital structure in response to 
equity market fluctuations, due to adjustment costs (Graham & Harvey, 2001). On the 
other hand, the possibility of having negative book values of equity favours the use of 
market values.  
 Our primary choice for expressing leverage was the traditional debt/equity ratio 
because we found it easy to understand and apply and perfectly representative of the 
relationship between the two basic sources of finance for all companies. However, we 
also report results for alternative definitions of leverage. Bearing in mind that the 
essence of capital structure analysis is assessing the pros and cons of long-term debt and 
equity finance (the financing of current assets is not considered a factor in capital 
structure analysis), we also tested the following ratios: long-term debt/equity, total 
debt/total assets, long-term debt/total assets. However, taking into account that, for 
reasons of saving time and money, companies often choose short-term bank lending in 
order to finance their investments, we also considered a ratio of total bank lending (both 
short- and long-term) to equity. 
 b. Expressions of leverage 
 Ratio analysis is a useful tool both for lenders and businesses. It allows them to 
see how a company is doing and compare this company with other businesses they have 
loaned money to. The most widely used measure of leverage is the leverage ratio.  
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 We use four different measures of leverage. After collecting all the relevant data, 
we calculated our leverage ratios using the following formulas. 
 Our basic ratio measures debt financing as a percentage of total financing and is 
called total debt to total equity. It is computed by dividing average total debt with 
average total shareholders’ equity. It provides insight about the proportion of debt to 
equity financing. More specifically, the debt to equity ratio measures how much money 
a company should safely be able to borrow over long periods of time. It indicates how 
much the company is leveraged in debt vis-avis what is owned. In other words it 
measures a company’s ability to borrow and pay off money. The debt to equity ratio is 
in the interest of creditors and investors, because it reveals the extent to which company 
management is willing to fund its operations with debt, rather than equity. 
 As a second leverage ratio, we calculate the total long-term debt to total equity 
ratio (also known as the gearing ratio) which is computed as average long-term debt to 
average total shareholders’ equity. A high gearing ratio is not preferable because it 
indicates possible difficulty in meeting long term debt obligations and it may signify 
future liquidity problems. If this number is too low it can signify inefficient use of the 
financing alternatives available to a company. Start-up companies with access to the 
debt markets, often have higher ratios than more established companies.  
Another ratio that we calculated is the total debt to total capital ratio which is 
equal to average total debt to average total assets. It is actually a measure of the 
percentage of assets financed with debt. This ratio is a proper way to check a company’s 
long-term solvency. The lower the debt ratio, the less total debt the business has in 
comparison to its asset base. On the other hand, businesses with high total debt ratios 
are in danger of becoming insolvent and going bankrupt.  
Finally, we used the long-term debt to total capital ratio which represents the 
percentage of assets financed with long-term debt. It is equal to average long-term debt 
to average total assets. The greater a company’s leverage, the higher the ratio. 
Generally, companies with higher leverage ratios are thought to be more risky because 
they have more liabilities and less equity.  
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Strategies in measuring leverage extend from basic to highly sophisticated and 
the degree of risk varies among them. The benefits of leveraging will depend on each 
company’s financial situation, objectives and attitude towards risk. Nonetheless, 
anything that has the potential to make money involves some risk. For example there 
may be a change in interest rates that could have an impact on the profit. There is a risk 
that an investment will not make enough profit to pay off the interest on a loan. 
 Finally, when measuring leverage ratios we should take for granted that there 
may be some limitations and approach them with a degree of caution. As Gill (1994) 
explained "Ratios do not make decisions for you, but will provide information from 
which decisions may be made." For example, ratios are based on the information which 
has been recorded in the financial statements that are always subject to several 
limitations. Consequently, ratios derived from financial statements are subject to the 
same limitations. In addition, ratios alone are not adequate. In fact, they are just 
indicators and other things need to be taken into consideration too. 
 
4.1.2. Credit ratings 
a. Empirical evidence 
 As it was already mentioned, companies place a great importance in credit 
ratings. Graham and Harvey (2001) reported that 57.1% of the 392 US CFOs questioned  
“What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?” 
responded “Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies)”, preceded only by 
financial flexibility (59.38%). Bancel and Mittoo (2002) conducted the same survey in 
710 firms from 17 European countries and found that the credit rating importance 
exceeded 72%. Kisgen (2006) argued and empirically proved that managers’ concerns 
about the benefits of an upgrade and costs related to a downgrade directly affect capital 
structure decisions. Intuitively we could state that since credit ratings are indisputably 
associated with a firm’s reputation, they most probably affect their accessibility to 
external financing as well as investors’ willingness to invest in their bonds. Kisgen also 
noted that since financial regulators rely on credit ratings – especially on the downgrade 
from investment to speculative grade – such changes should play a decisive role in the 
decision making process. 
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b. The MORE model 
 Amadeus uses the Multi Objective Rating Evaluation (MORE) model  
-developed by modeFinance- to assess the general creditworthiness of European 
companies by evaluating data included in their financial statements. The basic idea of 
the model is to analyze a set of financial and economic ratios in a predictive corporate 
bankruptcy model in order to create a fundamental credit rating model for each 
industrial sector.  Then, the MORE rating is calculated using the company’s financial 
data so that an indication of the company’s financial risk level is created. The main idea 
is to assign ratings by studying, evaluating and aggregating the most important aspects 
of the financial and economic behaviour of a company, meaning: profitability, liquidity, 
solvency, interest coverage and efficiency. The MORE rating is divided into four 
categories as described in the following table. 
Table 4.1.   MORE rating categories and interpretations 
Rating category  MORE Rating  Assessment  
Healthy companies  AAA  - strong capacity to meet financial commitments - 
excellent economic and financial flow and fund 
equilibrium 
AA  - strong creditworthiness 
- good capital structure and economic and financial 
equilibrium 
- slight difference from 'AAA'  
A  - high solvency  
- susceptibility to the adverse effect of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than 
companies in higher rated categories 
Balanced companies  BBB  - capital structure and economic equilibrium 
considered adequate 
- capacity to meet financial commitments could be 
affected by serious unfavorable events 
BB  - more vulnerable than companies rated 'BBB'  
- major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse 
business, financial or economic conditions 
Vulnerable companies  B  - vulnerable signals regarding the company’s 
fundamentals  
- adverse business, financial, or economic conditions 
will be likely to impair the company's capacity or 
willingness to meet its financial commitments 
CCC  - dangerous disequilibrium on the capital structure 
and the economic and financial fundamentals of the 
company  
- adverse market events and an inadequate 
management could affect with high probability the 
company's solvency 
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 In the present analysis we are interested in changes in the corporate credit 
ratings. To achieve our purpose, we create dummy variables that express these changes. 
 
4.1.3. Profitability 
 Profitability is beyond doubt one of the most important determinants in capital 
structure decision making, however, its impact on leverage is widely disputable. 
According to the pecking order theory firms prefer to use retained earnings as a primary 
source of financing and turn to external funds only when internal ones are insufficient, 
suggesting an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage (Myers and  
Majluf, 1984). Other theories support a positive relationship between the two due to the 
property of leverage to act as a signal of a firm’s quality and the undisputable benefits 
of interests’ deductibility. In general, profitable firms face lower expected costs of 
financial distress and benefit from debt tax-shields, favoring a positive relationship 
between profitability and leverage (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  
 In this study we use the return on assets (ROA) as it is provided by Amadeus 
(Net Income/Total Assets) as a proxy for profitability.  
 
4.1.4. Liquidity 
 Sibilkov (2007) based on the study of DeAngelos and Wruck (2002) suggests 
that asset liquidity affects expected costs of financial distress and agency costs, 
consituting this way an important determinant of capital structure. Moreover, firms 
prioritize internal financing which means that if their liquid assets are sufficient to 
finance their operations, they will not turn to external financing, indicating a negative 
relationship between liquidity and leverage. 
Risky companies  CC  - signals of high vulnerability  
- adverse market and economic conditions could 
increase the company's strong disequilibrium  
C  - considerable pathological situations  
- very low capacity to meet financial commitments  
D  - no capacity to meet financial commitments any 
longer 
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 In our analysis liquidity is expressed by the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (current ratio), as given by Amadeus. 
 
4.1.5. Tangibility 
 Simply put, tangible assets can be used as collateral in external borrowing, 
therefore, helping a firm’s accessibility in bank loans at a lower cost and simultaneously 
reducing the risk of the lender. This could lead the firm to high levels of debt, yet 
agency costs of collateralized debt are always lower than those of unsecured debt. We, 
therefore, expect a positive relationship between tangibility (Tangible Assets/Total 
Assets) and leverage. 
 
4.1.6. Firm size 
 Empirical evidence of the positive relationship between firm size and leverage is 
reported in the pertinent literature. Intuitively, we can verify this idea, since large firms 
systematically reduce default risk through the apportionment of operations and due to 
the stability of their cash flows and have lower-cost access to external financing. 
Economies of scale, bargaining power with creditors and low information asymmetry 
are some of the reasons why large firms enjoy easier and cheaper access to debt 
markets. Rajan and Zingales (1995) empirically proved that leverage increases with size 
in all G-7 countries except for Germany and attribute it to the fact that larger firms face 
lower expected bankruptcy costs that enable them to take on more leverage. In this 
thesis, we use the natural logarithm of total sales as a proxy for firms’ size. 
 
4.1.7. Effective tax rate 
 Since interest payments are tax deductible, we expect firms that are likely to 
produce higher levels of taxable income to have more debt in their capital structures, 
indicating a positive association between effective tax rate and leverage. On the other 
hand, Stickney and McGee (1982) empirically showed that firms with the lowest 
effective tax rates tend to be highly leveraged, while in Titman and Wessels (1988) non-
debt tax shields do not appear to be related to the various measures of leverage used.  
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We use tax rate as the ratio of income taxes to the pretax income. Amadeus 
reports negative values of taxation too, possibly accounting for tax refunds. In that case 
we set the observation equal to zero because essentially there is no payable tax and, 
therefore, no observable tax rate. 
 
4.1.8. Growth opportunities 
 Myers (1977) showed that firms having risky debt outstanding and acting in 
their shareholders’ interest have incentives to under- and overinvest in future growth 
opportunities i.e. tend to neglect valuable opportunities that could positively contribute 
to the firm’s market value. This loss in firm value that is due to suboptimal investment 
decisions constitutes a significant component of the agency cost of debt. In case of 
overinvestment, debt limits the agency costs of managerial discretion. So firms with 
high growth opportunity may not issue debt in the first place and an inverse relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage is expected to hold (Niu, 2008). 
 Growth opportunities are broadly defined as market value of equity over book 
value of equity. In our study, we used the price-to-book ratio, which is virtually the 
same value with that of market value of equity over book value of equity. Due to data 
unavailability regarding this ratio, 19 companies were left out of our analysis. 
 
4.2. Tests for equality analysis 
 Having estimated the ratios, we employ tests for equality for examining the 
equality of means and medians of different samples. With the help of these tests we can 
check whether changes in credit ratings induce changes in capital structure variables 
from year to year.  
For the purpose of our analysis we categorized the companies into two samples 
according to their credit rating change with the terms ‘‘upgrade’’ and ‘‘downgrade’’ and 
separated the corresponding accounts we needed. Then we formed the final samples by 
putting all observations together irrespective of years (i.e. one sub-sample below the 
other). All firms with no available credit ratings were excluded from the analysis. 
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What caused the credit rating change and how the capital structure is influenced 
is our main goal. Note that we create three year period ratios because a credit rating is 
formed at the end of the every year and, therefore, we observe the impact of credit 
rating change in the following year. On the other hand, we need to know the previous 
year credit rating in order to compare it with the current credit rating. The purpose is to 
estimate how the debt was influenced before and after the credit rating change. In our 
analysis, we denote T the year which the credit rating changes, T+1 the year after the 
change and T-1 the year prior to the change. 
The two-tailed test and the Mann-Whitney test are used for checking differences 
in means and medians, respectively. For instance, we can test whether the change in the 
proportion of debt to equity and debt to assets is important and significant. The equality 
test carries out simple hypothesis tests regarding the means and medians, across sub-
periods of series. Mean and median are considered as the most suitable measures to 
describe the central tendency of our samples. They both examine where, in a data set, 
numbers are likely to occur with the highest frequency. The mean, or average, is 
calculated by summing all of the observed values and dividing by the number of 
observations. The median is usually the number that occurs in the middle of a set of 
numbers. We also winsorised our results by trimming all outliers. 
 We conduct two tests, one for the equality of means and one of medians by 
implementing it in both samples under examination on the different leverage ratios for 
the three-year period around the credit rating change (i.e. before, after and in the year of 
the change). Each test is based on the null hypothesis that the series of sub-periods have 
the same mean or median against the alternative that they are not the same. 
 In case of the first test of means the tables give us a summary for the series 
depicting the Anova F- test (analysis of variance) probability value which is the most 
important element for the equality of series. More specifically, the p-value is the 
benchmark for the rejection of the equality of means of series or not. In the table below 
is depicted the Anova F-test which is a statistical test that generalizes student’s two-
sample t-test which refers to more than two groups. In an Anova F-test we usually 
assume that the group variances are equal and that there is homogeneity. Moreover, the 
output gives us the category statistics of the series and more specifically the mean, the 
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standard deviation and the standard error of mean. However, we are actually interested 
in the means of the series so we chose not to present all the other results.  
The second test we performed for the equality of medians refers to the same  
sub-samples and ratios. Looking at the outcome of the test we can examine the null 
hypothesis that the series of the sub-periods have the same general distribution, against 
the alternative that at least one series has a different distribution. We again check on the 
p-values to understand the relationship among the medians and whether it is significant. 
The Chi-square test for the median is a rank-based Anova test based on the comparison 
of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. 
Conover (1980) notes that this test is also called ‘median test’. It represents a statistical 
method to examine whether two or more variables are independent.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a generalization of the Mann-Whitney test and 
examines the equality of more than two subgroups. The idea behind the Mann-Whitney 
test is to rank the series from the lowest value to the highest one. If the groups have the 
same median, the values should be similar. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric 
(distribution free) test and is used when the assumptions of Anova are not met (more 
than two independent variable groups and normally distributed series).  
The null hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test is that the samples are derived 
from identical variables. We should also mention that if the calculated value of  
the Kruskal-Wallis test is less than the chi-square table value, then the null hypothesis 
will be accepted. If the calculated value of the Kruskal-Wallis test is greater than the 
chi-square table value, then we will reject the null hypothesis saying that the sample 
comes from different variables. It should also be noted that the Kruskal-Wallis test 
reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as X² with G-1 degrees of freedom 
under the null hypothesis. Apart from the p-values of the tests’ statistics, we present the 
medians for the series. 
 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
 We use regression analysis in order to empirically test whether changes in credit 
ratings affect capital structure decisions of Greek listed companies. The original 
conception was to regress a variable that would represent the leverage of each company 
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on a dummy variable that would represent the change in the credit rating. Taking into 
consideration that there are other factors affecting capital structure too, as well as the 
fact that omission of important variables in a regression could cause the estimated 
coefficients on all other variables to be biased and inconsistent, we decided to include 
selectively six more regressors, representing factors that theoretically affect the level of 
leverage in most companies. 
 Initially, we organised our data in two-year periods obviously because this was 
the only way to observe changes in the companies’ credit ratings (from previous year to 
the next). This way we obtained seven pairs of years (2001-2002, 2002-2003, … , 2007-
2008) each one including observation series of all the companies with a credit rating 
available for both years and the respective factors under analysis for the second year of 
the period. For example, the 2001-2002 sub-sample includes all companies with a 
known rating both in 2001 and 2002 (in order to detect whether there is a rating change) 
and the leverage, ROA, tangibility etc of those companies for year 2002. For the 
purpose of regression analysis we formed a full sample that contains all the pairs of 
years. 
 Putting the sub-samples together we came up against seasonality. This happened 
because some companies appeared in the sample more than once; for example a 
company that experienced changes in its rating between the years 2002-2003, 2004-
2005 and 2005-2006 appeared in the sample three times and so forth. In order to cope 
with seasonality and examine the degree to which it is present, we created dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 for the two-year period they refer to and 0 for every 
other period. If an intercept is used in the regression, the number of dummies that can 
be included should be one less than the ‘seasonality’ of the data (Brooks, 2008). Having 
seven pairs of years in our analysis, the appropriate number of seasonal dummies for 
our sample is six, leaving without a dummy the sub-sample with the least observations 
i.e. the period 2001-2002. 
We conduct three kinds of tests. The first one includes all companies of the 
sample (full sample) and tests the impact of rating changes on leverage between 
companies that actually had a rating change and those that did not. In this case, the 
dummy variable representing the credit rating, takes the value of 1 for companies that 
have a rating change from one year to the next and the value of 0 for companies whose 
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credit rating remain stable during the same period. The purpose of this test is to examine 
whether credit rating changes affect capital structure. A non-significant credit rating 
dummy would imply that companies do not restructure their financing decisions when 
they are either up- or downgraded.  
The second test refers only to the companies that actually had a credit rating 
change. In this case, the credit rating dummy ‘splits’ the sample into companies that 
enjoy an upgrade (CR dummy = 1) and companies that experience a downgrade (CR 
dummy = 0). The seasonal dummies remain the same in both tests. The purpose of this 
test is to ascertain whether the direction of the change plays any role in the level of 
leverage that companies choose. The test acquires special importance in case the first 
regression produces a significant credit rating variable. If rating changes indeed affect 
capital structure decisions, the next step is to examine whether the direction of the 
change creates a specific pattern in the way companies cope with it. Hence, we expect 
that companies experiencing a downgrade (especially those in the lower levels of the 
rating scale) should be more careful with the amount of debt they choose to undertake, 
first because their downgrade is a sign of falling creditworthiness and second because 
more debt (which they will not be able to service, since they already have problems 
meeting their present obligations) could cause a further downgrade. 
Kisgen (2006) argued that “since several regulations are specific to the 
investment-grade versus speculative grade designation, effects should be greatest 
around this change if these regulations are significant for decision making”. This point 
motivated us to conduct a third test by restricting the upgrade/downgrade test to changes 
from the investment grade to the speculative grade and vice versa.  
The credit rating scale provided by Amadeus is identical to the one used by 
Standard & Poor’s, one of the three dominant credit rating agencies in the market. 
Investment grade refers to the quality of a company’s credit. Investment grade 
companies are rated ‘BBB’ or higher by S&P and are assumed to be able to meet 
payment obligations so that banks are allowed to invest in them. Companies rated ‘BB’ 
or lower belong to speculative grade group, meaning that the probability that the 
company will service its debt is deemed to be speculative.  
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The transition from investment to speculative grade and vice versa is deemed to 
play significant role in the decision making process. The reason behind this speculation 
is rather obvious. A company rated ‘AA’ will not lose much of its creditworthiness and 
quality if it is downgraded to ‘A’ hence it is possible that managers will not take any 
action against this change in terms of capital restructuring. A downgrade from ‘A’ to 
‘BB’ though, will automatically put the sign “junk” on the bonds of this company,  
forcing managers to try to reverse this unpleasant situation as soon as possible. For this 
test we created a new sample by isolating the companies that incurred a rating change 
from the investment/speculative to speculative/investment grade. The seasonal dummies 
remain the same. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. Results of empirical tests 
 As already mentioned, the main objective of this thesis is the examination of the 
relationship between changes in credit ratings and capital structure. To achieve that, we 
have recourse to both statistical and regression analysis. In this section we present the 
results of the empirical analysis and provide interpretation. 
 
5.1. Test for equality outputs 
 Table 5.1 presents the results from the tests of equality. In specific, we report the 
means and medians of four leverage ratios before (T-1), on (T) and after (T+1) changes 
in credit ratings. We identify two kinds of credit ratings: upgrades and downgrades. The 
first ratio we examine is total debt to total assets for upgraded firms. We see that the  
p-value is very close above the 10% level of significance but still not enough to reject 
the null hypothesis of means equality prior and post to credit ratings changes. Although 
in the year prior to the change the mean is 57.62%, it diminishes to 52.67% in year T 
and again rises to 53.70% after the credit rating change, we cannot argue that 
statistically these three numbers are different from each other. On the contrary, the 
median of the ratio decreases (from 61.32% to 55.80%) after the upgrading and this 
decrease is statistically significant according to both tests for equality of medians. 
 Looking at the ratio for all years we observe that on average the ratio takes 
values between 30% and 60% whilst good performers can get a value of less than 10%.  
A ratio greater than 60% means that the company's assets are financed by debt, and thus 
lenders bear the greatest portion of risk. This suggests that creditors may have difficulty 
in collecting their loan from the business in the event of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Surprisingly, some companies reached a value in excess of 70%. 
 For example, we see that some companies (e.g. Ideal Group) have a D/A ratio of 
more than 100% which results in having negative shareholders equity in their balance 
sheets. A possible explanation is that companies may have come to the market via a 
reverse takeover or may have emerged from a management buy-out (Temple, 2007).
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Table 5.1.  Summary results of Tests for Equality 
Variable 
D/E Ratio 
Long term 
Debt/ Equity 
ratio 
Total Debt/  
Total assets ratio  
(%) 
Long term Debt/ 
Total assets ratio 
(%) 
D/E Ratio 
Long term 
Debt/ Equity 
ratio 
Total Debt/ Total 
assets ratio  
(%) 
Long term Debt/ 
Total assets ratio 
(%) 
 
UPGRADES 
(N=220) 
DOWNGRADES 
(N=324) 
 
Probability Probability 
Anova F-test 0.9012 0.8210 0.1441 0.7485 0.6913 0.5343 0.0001 0.0179 
Med.Chi-square 0.0583 0.6010 0.0259 0.3547 0.0120 0.4709 0.0002 0.3252 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.3949 0.6035 0.0939 0.3154 0.0186 0.1229 0.0000 0.0674 
  
 Value Value 
Mean (T+1) 1.933540 0.722334 53.70797 16.35155 3.059500 0.808439 62.96519 19.44578 
Mean (T) 2.077815 0.645878 52.67903 15.52560 2.576178 0.836758 59.49195 17.55068 
Mean (T-1) 2.186727 0.793347 57.62195 15.25801 1.877097 0.537954 52.90724 15.93581 
 
  
Median (T+1) 1.201529 0.292793 55.80369 13.52829 1.508875 0.379258 62.13687 16.28720 
Median (T) 1.262537 0.260297 55.86493 12.51207 1.541136 0.359431 62.09583 14.28193 
Median (T-1) 1.536341 0.236028 61.32542 9.75823 1.262507 0.318284 56.33077 13.53066 
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However, sometimes the advantage of higher leverage is that owners will reap 
higher returns when conditions are good and the business is profitable. On the other 
hand, companies with low debt to asset ratio finance the majority of assets through 
equity and not with debt. That’s the reason why the respective accounts of assets and 
shareholders’ in the balance sheet are changing. 
 Another important ratio that we analyze is total debt to total shareholders’ 
equity. The debt to equity ratio measures how much debt is used to finance the company 
relative to the amount of equity used. Using debt financing is riskier for the company 
than using equity financing. Calculating this ratio is important because, as the 
proportion of debt financing increases, the risk of the firm also goes up. Looking at the 
ratio we see that the p-value for the upgrading companies is 0.9012 which means that 
we accept the null hypothesis that the series have equal means. This means that the D/E 
ratio is statistically constant although we may observe a 3-year decrease. Regarding the 
median test for equality the probability in the Chi–square is 0.0583 whereas the 
Kruskal-Wallis appears 0.3949. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of equal medians 
before and after the credit rating change. 
 From a sample of 220 companies with upgrade credit ratings almost half of them 
have a reduction in the D/E ratio in the year after the credit rating change, in contrast to 
the other years where we observe an increase in the D/E ratio, implying higher risk for 
companies. We also observe that most ratios take values higher than one which means 
that assets are mainly financed with debt. Conversely, ratios of less than one imply that 
most of the financing is derived from equity. Some companies present a negative D/E 
ratio (e.g. Atermon, Ideal Group) which they can improve by increasing their profits i.e. 
by increasing the number of profitable activities and by increasing productivity. 
Moreover, there is a sharp drop in the D/E ratio of ‘Praxitelio’ from 47.61 to 9.11 in 
year T+1 and this probably attributes to shareholders’ funds which almost doubled from 
the year prior to the credit rating change to the year after change. 
 Next we assess the long term debt to assets ratio which ranges between 0 and 1. 
We see that the p-value is 0.74 which implies no statistically significant change in the 
years around the credit rating change. Similarly, the p-value for the chi–square test is 
0.3547, whereas the Kruskal-Wallis test decreases to 0.3154 implying that median 
values of the ratio did not change significantly. 
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 We also analyze the long term debt/total shareholder equity ratio. The mean 
equality test accepts the null hypothesis of no statistical difference, with p-value of 0.82. 
Virtually, the mean falls in the year of change and then increases to 0.72 for the 
following year, but these changes are not statistically significant. We observe that the 
median follows the exact same pattern i.e. with p-values of 0.60 in both tests we assert 
that the medians are statistically equal too.  
As a whole, we can argue that increases in the companies’ credit ratings have, on 
average, no significant impact on any of the four different leverage ratios we chose to 
examine (except for the median of total debt/total assets ratio).  
 Regarding companies with downgrade credit ratings we also apply the test for 
equality for both means and medians. First, the total debt to total assets ratio leads us to 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means since the p-value almost approaches 0. The 
significantly different means escalate through the three-year period and reach 62.96%. 
The chi-square test and Kruskal-Wallis tests present also unequal medians. Moreover, 
the total debt to total assets ratio reaches high levels for the majority of companies.  
 However, the D/E ratio produces different results reaching a probability value 
equal to 0.69. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of mean equality although we 
virtually observe an improvement in means, amounting to 3.05 in the year after the 
credit rating change. In contrast, we reject the null hypothesis of equal medians across 
years since the p-values for chi-square is 0.0120 and that of Kruskal-Wallis is 0.0186. 
Econometrics suggests that the median may be a better indicator of the most typical 
value in a series if the set of data has an outlier. However, when the sample size is large 
and does not include outliers, the mean value usually provides a better measure of 
central tendency. Since our sample does not contain extreme values, we can assert that, 
in general, decreases in credit ratings do not have a significant impact on the D/E ratio. 
 We apply the test for equality of means for the long term debt to total assets. The 
results show that the Anova F-test value is 0.0179 and therefore we reject the hypothesis 
that the means are equal. On the other hand, the equality of medians is accepted as it can 
be inferred from the chi-square (0.3252) and Kruskal-Wallis (0.0674) tests. 
Finally, we examine the long term debt to total shareholders’ equity and we find 
a p-value of more than 0.5 for the mean implying no statistical difference among the 
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years of change. Moreover, the results from the chi-square and Kruskal-Wallis tests lead 
us to the conclusion that medians did not change significantly in the three-year period.  
Our overall results indicate that, on average, downgraded companies issue more 
debt scaled by total assets in the year of the credit rating change as well as in the year 
following the downgrade. This is mostly due to a significant increase in the ratio of 
long-term debt scaled by assets. Insignificant differences in the debt/equity ratios 
indicate that the equity must have increased accordingly in order to preserve a 
statistically constant ratio. 
Although they may seem intimidating at first glance, all ratios can be derived by 
simply comparing numbers that appear on a business’s balance sheet. As Gill (1994)   
notes "small business owners would be well-served to think of ratios as one of your best 
friends when scrutinizing your business." It is true that business owners and managers 
could use ratios as an important tool to measure their progress toward reaching 
company goals or compete with larger companies. As for small businesses studying 
ratios give them the opportunity to adapt trends affecting their operations. 
 
5.2. Regression analysis 
 To measure the effect of credit rating changes to the capital structure of Greek 
listed firms, we use multivariate regression analysis. As it was already mentioned, we 
use five measures of leverage in order to cover as many as possible interpretations of 
leverage known. The first four measures have already been described in the previous 
sub-section (4.1.1b). However, here we also include a fifth measure of leverage defined 
as bank lending to total shareholders’ equity. Genimakis (2008) suggests that firms -in 
an attempt to save time and money- often finance certain investment projects with short-
term funds (or/and more permanent short-term borrowing) so, for that reason, we also 
consider in our analysis the ratio of total bank (both long- and short-term) lending to 
equity. 
 The key point of our analysis is whether changes in credit ratings play any role 
in the way companies structure their capital. We find that the credit rating dummy 
indicating upgrade or downgrade, is statistically significant in many of the regressions. 
This result imply that managers take the credit rating seriously into consideration when 
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they are about to make finance decisions. We should also make clear that the results 
depend seriously on the measure of leverage used, as well as on some factors suggested 
in the literature. Before examining each group of tests and analysing the results, we 
consider appropriate an interpretation of basic statistics that appear in our tables. 
 
5.2.1. Interpretation of basic statistics 
R squared (R2) 
R2 is the most common goodness of fit statistic i.e. a quantity that tests how well 
the regression function fits the data. It is defined as the square of the correlation 
between the values of the dependent variable and the corresponding fitted values from 
the model hence it lies between -1 and +1 by definition. Put in simple words, if, for 
example, R2 equals 0.98 (or else 98%) this means that the model explains nearly 98% of 
the variability of the dependent variable about its mean value, while a value close to 
zero indicates that the model fits the data poorly. 
Adjusted R2 
 The adjusted R2 solves one of the problems that appear when using R2 as a 
goodness of fit measure. While simple R2 will always rise as more variables are added 
to the model (whatever the significance of these regressors might be), the adjusted R2 
will actually fall, unless the increase in R2 offsets the loss of degrees of freedom caused 
by adding an extra regressor, therefore serving as a tool for determining whether a 
variable should be included in the regression model. 
F-statistic 
 The regression F-statistic tests the multiple hypotheses that all of the regressors’ 
coefficients except the intercept coefficient are zero. The P-value attached to it must be 
lower than the selected level of significance for the null hypothesis to be rejected. It 
indicates the overall adequacy of the model. 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 DW is a test for first order autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression. One 
of the assumptions underlying the classical linear regression model is that the 
covariance between the errors terms must be zero i.e. that the errors are not 
autocorrelated. The DW test takes three important values 0, 2 and 4, corresponding to 
evidence of positive, zero and negative autocorrelation.  
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Heteroscedasticity 
 Another assumption of the central limit theorem (CLM) requires that the errors 
have a constant variance i.e. that they are homoscedastic. All regressions were estimated 
with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  
 
5.2.2. Full sample 
 The first group of regressions tests the impact of rating changes on leverage 
between companies that have a rating change and those that do not. The results of the 
tests are summarised in table 5.3. The asterisks *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, significance levels, respectively. 
Looking at the regression residuals’ table we came up against a huge outlier 
corresponding to the 240th observation and was due to an extremely low level of equity 
reported for Lavipharm S.A. in 2004 that produced a D/E ratio of 5,879.3. Following 
Brook’s suggestion (2008), in order to effectively remove this outlier, we created a 
dummy variable defined as dum240 = 1 for the 240th observation and zero otherwise. 
Because the outlier was attributed to an equity value, it was omitted from the 
regressions in which leverage was not expressed in terms of equity. 
The opponents of outlier dummies would argue that removing outlying 
observations will reduce standard errors and the residual sum of squares, therefore 
increasing R2 and artificially improving the apparent fit of the model to the data. Brooks 
(2008), however, argues that “Dummy variables may be justifiably used to remove 
observations corresponding to ‘one-off’ or extreme events that are considered highly 
unlikely to be repeated, and the information content of which in deemed of no relevance 
of the data as a whole”. We consider a D/E ratio of almost 6,000 to be an extreme and 
irrelevant piece of information that could produce rather ‘junk’ than representative 
results.  
 Before running the regressions, we test for the existence of multicollineraity 
among the employed variables. In the presence of multicollinearity the regression 
becomes very sensitive to small changes in the specification and significance tests and 
may, therefore, give inappropriate conclusions. In other words, the regression might 
look good as a whole (high R2), while the individual variables might not be significant. 
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The outputs of the first and last regressions, where the number of insignificant 
regressors is relatively high, are conceived as a probable evidence of multicollinearity.  
Table 5.2.  Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
  CR dummy ROA 
Current  
Ratio Tangibility ln(Sales) 
Effective  
Tax Rate Price-to-book 
CR dummy 1.0000 -0.1464 -0.0241 -0.0447 -0.1023 -0.0246 -0.0065 
ROA -0.1464 1.0000 0.0378 -0.1148 0.2419 -0.0178 0.1342 
Current Ratio -0.0241 0.0378 1.0000 -0.2049 -0.2563 -0.0082 -0.0289 
Tangibility -0.0447 -0.1148 -0.2049 1.0000 0.1124 0.0088 -0.0535 
ln(Sales) -0.1023 0.2419 -0.2563 0.1124 1.0000 -0.0214 0.0769 
Effective Tax Rate -0.0246 -0.0178 -0.0082 0.0088 -0.0214 1.0000 -0.0074 
Price-to-book -0.0065 0.1342 -0.0289 -0.0535 0.0769 -0.0074 1.0000 
 
 Table 5.2, presents the results from the correlation matrix. We see that there is 
no indication of high correlation among the explanatory variables of the regression.  
In Table 5.3 the credit rating dummy appears significant at the 10% level in 
three out of five regressions. We consider the results more than satisfying since the tests 
producing an insignificant CR dummy have a considerably lower R2 than the ones 
presenting a significant CR dummy. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates a 
positive relationship between credit rating changes and leverage. We can therefore 
argue that firms close to a rating change3 increase the amount of debt they use relative 
to the amount of equity. We take a step further and argue that the debt increase is mostly 
attributed to the increase in short-term debt, since the CR dummy coefficient in the 
second regression (dependent variable is the long-term debt/equity) is significantly 
lower than the coefficients of regressions, in which leverage includes both long-term 
and short-term debt. We suppose that the magnitude of leverage is mostly due to 
changes in the short-term external financing of companies. 
 Regarding seasonal effects, we observe that using as leverage the ratio of long-
term debt to equity has produced statistically significant seasonal dummies. This 
indicates  that certain periods  (i.e. 2003-2004 and 2006-2008)  play a significant role in 
                                                             
3 We use the expression “close to a rating change” because it best corresponds to the way we structured 
the tests. We used rating changes from year, let us say, T to year T+1 and values of all other variables 
(leverage, ROA, current ratio etc) corresponding to year T+1, meaning that all these values are reported 
before the rating of year T+1 is assigned. Hence we can only speak of companies being close to a rating 
change and not after a rating change. 
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Table 5.3.  Sample Summary Statistics – Credit Ratings & Leverage (full sample) 
 
  D/E Ratio   
Long term 
Debt/Equity   
Total Debt/ 
Total assets    
Long term 
Debt/ Total 
assets   
Bank Lending/ 
Equity 
 Variable Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. 
Intercept -0.1521 0.8965 -0.5818 0.0361** 0.1414 0.0083* -0.1709 0.0000* -0.0242 0.9835 
CR dummy 0.9606 0.0136** 0.2359 0.0816*** 0.0106 0.3596 -0.0076 0.3281 0.9965 0.0474** 
Profitability  -6.0283 0.0735*** -1.9911 0.0381** -1.0400 0.0000* -0.1678 0.0005* -4.2624 0.0850*** 
Liquidity -0.0207 0.0240*** -0.0016 0.4985 -0.0068 0.0000* -0.0003 0.1180 -0.0112 0.2899 
Tangibility -0.0118 0.9900 0.7576 0.0433** -0.1471 0.0000* 0.2122 0.0000* -0.0306 0.9754 
Firm size 0.1227 0.2069 0.0487 0.0699*** 0.0389 0.0000* 0.0198 0.0000* 0.0330 0.6300 
Effective Tax Rate 0.0005 0.8154 -0.0015 0.0753*** 0.0000 0.7885 -0.0004 0.0008* -0.0003 0.9020 
Growth Opportunities 0.1757 0.2557 0.0660 0.3149 0.0031 0.1986 0.0010 0.4845 0.1549 0.3003 
dum240 5877.7190 0.0000 614.1236 0.0000  -  -  -  - 3431.2430 0.0000 
           R-squared   0.9987   0.9850   0.3461   0.2363   0.9940 
Adjusted R-squared   0.9987   0.9848   0.3385   0.2274   0.9939 
F-statistic   63974.7100   5256.5540   45.8026   26.7724   13287.2400 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.0420   2.0615   2.0264   1.9369   2.0466 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively  
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the companies’ decision to be financed with more long-term bank loans compared to 
equity.  
 We must also note that the profitability as expressed by the return on assets ratio 
(ROA) significantly affects leverage. Moreover, most of the variables appeared to have 
the predicted signs, with the exception of tangibility and growth opportunities. 
Tangibility is predicted to be positively related to leverage, but here appears to have 
negative signs. However, it has the predicted sign in the second regression, where 
tangibility is statistically significant and the R2 is high. Growth opportunities appear to 
have the exact opposite sign from the predicted, but they are not significant in any of the 
regressions. It should be noted that all DW values lie around 2 indicating no 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  
 In sum, we can assert that there is strong empirical evidence that credit rating 
changes play a significant role in the capital structure decision process for the majority 
of Greek listed companies. It is surprising though, that most of the factors that are 
supposed to affect leverage according to the pertinent literature, appear to be 
insignificant in our study. To provide a justification to this “irregularity” we focus our 
attention to the second model that expresses leverage as long-term debt/equity. This is 
consistent with the capital structure analysis framework that focuses on the tradeoff 
between long-term debt and equity as financing sources. 
 
5.2.3. Upgrades – Downgrades 
 When looking at the sample of companies that have a rating change (table 5.4) 
the results are completely different. It seems that the direction of the rating change plays 
no role in the capital structure decision making. Note that in this set of regressions the 
CR dummy takes the value of 1 when a company is upgraded and the value of 0 when 
the opposite happens. 
 The CR dummy appears insignificant in all regressions, indicating that the 
direction of the rating changes does not affect the capital structure process. Combining 
these results with the ones analysed above, we can clearly state that Greek listed firms 
about to undergo a credit rating change, restructure their capital no matter the direction 
of the credit rate change. 
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Table 5.4.  Sample Summary Statistics – Credit Ratings & Leverage (upgrades-downgrades) 
 
 
  D/E Ratio   
Long term 
Debt/ Equity   
Total Debt/ 
Total assets    
Long term 
Debt/ Total 
assets   
Bank Lending/ 
Equity 
 Variable Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. 
Intercept 1.9111 0.3180 -0.3238 0.6121 0.1449 0.0925 -0.1707 0.0005* 2.2202 0.1837 
CR dummy -0.5383 0.3433 -0.2292 0.3489 -0.0127 0.5313 -0.0078 0.5579 -0.5835 0.4027 
Profitability  -7.5651 0.0958*** -2.2865 0.0548*** -0.9673 0.0000* -0.1088 0.0894*** -6.1073 0.0195** 
Liquidity -0.0414 0.0304** -0.0033 0.6738 -0.0086 0.0000* 0.0002 0.5364 -0.0373 0.0993*** 
Tangibility 0.7659 0.6670 0.8862 0.1878 -0.1357 0.0066* 0.2232 0.0000* -0.3139 0.8650 
Firm size -0.0119 0.9388 0.0273 0.4934 0.0385 0.0000* 0.0188 0.0000* -0.0991 0.3021 
Effective Tax Rate -0.0473 0.5828 -0.0641 0.0475** 0.0033 0.3987 -0.0082 0.0007* -0.0397 0.7196 
Growth Opportunities 0.3498 0.1485 0.1712 0.1664 0.0137 0.0001* 0.0079 0.0060* 0.2021 0.2892 
           R-squared   0.0524   0.0508   0.3733   0.2569   0.0444 
Adjusted R-squared   0.0274   0.0257   0.3568   0.2373   0.0192 
F-statistic   2.0938   2.0245   22.5467   13.0858   1.7600 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0133   0.0174   0.0000   0.0000   0.0466 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.1239   2.0963   2.2676   2.1992   2.0982 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively 
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The only significant regressor is profitability – just like in the full sample. The 
signs of the regressors change randomly from test to test, again with the exception of 
ROA coefficients, which are all negative. Hence we can empirically confirm the 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage that was described in the 
previous section. We also observe that using the D/E ratio as leverage measure, we 
obtain the same significant determinants of leverage. 
 
5.2.4. Changes between investment and speculative grade 
 In this section we investigate the effect of changing credit ratings below or 
above investment grade level as it is specified in Amadeus database. In specific, we 
analyse companies that experience an upgrading in their credit ratings to the investment 
grade i.e. companies that have a credit rating higher than ‘BBB’ or a credit rating that is 
equal or lower than ‘BB’. These tests have a special meaning because companies below 
the investment grade are considered easy targets for speculative attacks, while 
investment grade companies enjoy easy banks’ financing. Table 5.5 depicts the results 
of the regressions. 
 The results are indeed very interesting. Initially, we rule out the last regression 
because the probability of the F-statistic suggests that the coefficients of all the 
explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero. The R2s are again very low compared to 
the full sample regressions but, as mentioned above, high R2s could be the effect of the 
outlier dummy. 
 The CR dummy is significant in three out of four regressions, implying that 
managers may not be interest in the direction of a rating change in general, but they are 
indeed concerned with falling below the investment grade. Intuitively we expect that a 
downgrade from investment to speculation grade would lead firms to reduce the amount 
of debt they use compared to equity, in an attempt to reverse this unpleasant situation. 
However here, the coefficient of the CR dummy is negative, indicating that downgrades 
have a positive impact on leverage ratios. Rauh and Sufi (2008) provide an acceptable 
explanation for this. They argue that such downgrades to the speculative grade could be 
due to inappropriate structure of debt within the firm and, as a result, companies 
increase the amount of secured and subordinated debt in order to return to the 
investment grade.  
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Table 5.5.  Sample Summary Statistics – Credit Ratings & Leverage (investment-speculative grade) 
 
  D/E Ratio   
Long term 
Debt/ Equity   
Total Debt/ 
Total assets    
Long term 
Debt/ Total 
assets   
Bank Lending/ 
Equity 
 Variable Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. 
Intercept -1.0571 0.3397 -0.8766 0.1108 0.1002 0.4639 -0.1425 0.0653*** 0.4611 0.6527 
CR dummy -0.5642 0.0077* -0.2137 0.0557*** -0.0689 0.0070* -0.0121 0.5332 0.0931 0.8341 
Profitability  0.8732 0.6421 0.8988 0.3848 -0.1638 0.4778 0.1307 0.5575 -0.3039 0.8081 
Liquidity -0.0156 0.0020* -0.0005 0.8156 -0.0063 0.0000* 0.0001 0.9091 -0.0161 0.0504*** 
Tangibility -0.5135 0.3245 0.5155 0.0686*** -0.0849 0.1889 0.2119 0.0000* 0.7377 0.4063 
Firm size 0.2075 0.0351** 0.0860 0.0759*** 0.0385 0.0016* 0.0164 0.0151** -0.0046 0.9648 
Effective Tax Rate 0.0086 0.9178 -0.0315 0.3289 -0.0025 0.6961 -0.0101 0.0056* -0.0486 0.4210 
Growth Opportunities 0.1596 0.0055* 0.0592 0.0059* 0.0183 0.0004* 0.0115 0.0011* 0.0447 0.3375 
           R-squared   0.2159   0.1743   0.4013   0.3236   0.0428 
Adjusted R-squared   0.1660   0.1217   0.3631   0.2805   -0.0182 
F-statistic   4.3213   3.3136   10.5180   7.5068   0.7014 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.7609 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.0532   2.0042   2.2379   2.0243   2.2093 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively
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We expect seasonal effects to be apparent in such a sample. We find seasonal 
dummies significant in all regressions especially between years 2006-2007 
and 2007-2008. The recent financial crisis, may be responsible for the alteration of 
many corporate credit ratings that provoked speculative attacks in the markets. A 
rational reaction of managers to this situation is the restructuring of capital in an attempt 
to gain their return to the investment grade. 
 The differences between simple and adjusted R2s led us to exclude many 
variables in the model, so we selectively re-ran the first regression including only the 
significant variables. In this case, the current ratio appeared to be insignificant. Its initial 
significance might be due to its correlation with firm size (ln(Sales)).  
 In this set of regressions size and growth opportunities appear to have 
statistically significant coefficients. The significance of firm size is attributed to the fact 
that larger firms face lower risk and thus are expected to have higher credit ratings (i.e. 
of the investment grade). Regarding growth opportunities, Gubin (2008) argues that 
“…firms might strategically direct investment allocations towards new growth 
opportunities or assets-in-place to affect both their ratings and, by extension, their 
investor clientele”. Having already assumed that companies in this sample will take 
action in order to affect their rating, we can also assume that they will do this by 
strategically allocating their debt funds towards new growth opportunities.  
 
5.3. Results’ overview 
 Looking at our results as a whole, we realize that the two methodologies we use 
are not completely consistent with each other. The tests for equality indicate that Greek 
companies, responding to an impending rating change, maintain, on average, 
statistically stable debt/equity ratios, while presenting (again on average) statistically 
significant changes in leverage ratios where debt is scaled by total assets (though only 
for downgraded companies).  
 On the contrary, the sets of regressions produce statistically significant credit 
rating variables mostly in cases where leverage is expressed as debt scaled by equity. 
We have to note though, that the models which enjoy the highest R2s and F-statistics are 
those having as dependent variables debt/assets ratios. 
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 Restricting the comparison to companies that have a rating change, we discern 
signs of consistency. The tests for equality show that most leverage ratios are, on 
average, statistically constant in the years around the credit rating change. This is 
consistent with the results of the second regressions’ set, which indicated that credit 
ratings do not affect any of the leverage ratios that we used. The significant changes of 
debt to assets ratios for downgraded companies could be due to the magnitude of 
companies that drop below the investment level. 
Over all, we consider it reassuring that, one way or another, leverage ratios show 
some kind of ‘sensitivity’ to rating changes. This result is consistent with Kisgen’s 
(2006) CR-CS theory and confirms managers’ allegations with respect to the 
importance of credit ratings in capital structure decisions.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact of credit rating changes on the capital 
structure of firms around the year of change, that is, before, after and in the year of the 
credit rating change. Credit ratings are of utmost importance to several groups of market 
participants, among whom are managers, who are responsible for making capital 
structure decisions. 
Leverage is a representative measure of capital structure and we used five 
different expressions of leverage in our analysis. Our methodology consists of both tests 
for equality in means and medians and regressions analysis. The tests for equality 
provided evidence of no statistical difference in means or medians for debt (total and 
long-term) to equity ratios for both upgraded and downgraded companies (except for the 
total debt to total assets ratio of upgraded companies). Conversely, the ratios of debt to 
total assets present statistically significant means in the case of downgraded companies. 
Furthermore, the equality test for medians implies that only debt to equity of upgraded 
and total debt to total assets of both upgraded and downgraded companies have different 
medians. 
We then ran a set of regressions on three different samples: the full sample of all 
companies (having a rating change or not), the sample of companies that had a rating 
change and the sample of companies, whose rating change altered from the investment 
grade. Credit ratings appeared to be significant explanatory variable of leverage in 6 out 
of 14 regressions (one regression appeared to be ‘junk’ so we do not take it into 
consideration). The key points of these results are:  
 The CR dummy appears significant mostly in regressions where leverage is 
expressed in terms of debt to equity rather than total assets. 
 The second set of regressions produced no significant credit rating variables. 
 None of the theoretically proposed determinants of leverage is consistently 
significant in all tests (among the three samples). Each regression produces, more 
or less, different significant explanatory variables. 
The results of the first sample imply a positive relationship between leverage and 
credit rating changes, whereas the third set of regressions implies a negative one. 
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 Our results provide mixed results regarding the impact of credit ratings changes on 
leverage. On one hand, we obtained statistical evidence that changes in credit 
ratings affect the level of leverage in firms’ capital structures. On the other hand, 
our tests appear inconsistent with each other.  
 
Nevertheless, there are certain limitations to the data and methods that we used, 
which need careful consideration. First of all, the assumption of residual normality is 
violated in all of our regressions, implying that the inferences we make about the 
coefficient estimates could be wrong. Copying with outliers is a way to approach 
normality in the residuals, but insufficient in our case.  
 Nevertheless, residual normality is not a big problem because the sample is 
sufficiently large and in such case residual normality is almost impossible (Norusis, 
2003). This study’s most serious defect is the use of Amadeus ratings. We hypothesized 
that companies take into account these ratings that are neither announced nor certified. 
Disregarding the fact that most Greek companies might not even be aware of Amadeus’ 
existence, we treated MORE ratings as if they were equal to the ratings provided by 
major credit rating agencies like Moody’s or S&P’s. This is a serious simplification that 
could be improved in a future research, including other European countries too.  
Another problem we acknowledge is that each database uses its own 
identification and interpretation of the companies’ accounts, and hence this could result 
in wrong calculations of ratios and variables. For example, Amadeus denotes as 
“Loans” the short-term financial debts to credit institutions; misinterpretation of this 
account could lead to completely wrong leverage ratios. 
Despite the above limitations, we believe that our research contributes to the 
existing literature by providing evidence from a market that is characterized by limited 
access to external finance sources and high management entrenchment. Future research 
should take into consideration the above limitations and apply more advanced 
econometric methods. 
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